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MDG6: AIDS and the Moral Economy of 





MDG 6, ‘to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases’, is unique among 
the MDGs because it emerged in the context of unprecedented prior 
international mobilisation, especially around HIV/AIDS, thus both reflecting 
and facilitating an expanding international health agenda. MDG 6 built on the 
idea of ‘health as development’, originally articulated at the 1978 conference on 
primary health at Alma-Ata, but was profoundly shaped by the political traction 
and fund-raising successes of AIDS activism and the international AIDS 
response. This underpinned the expansion of MDG 6 targets to include 
antiretroviral treatment (ART), helped forge partnerships to reduce the prices of 
ART and essential medicine, thereby contributing to MDG 8 (‘building 
partnerships for development’) and, in high HIV-prevalence regions, also to 
MDGs 4 and 5 (maternal and child health). The moral-economic dimensions of 
the international AIDS response point to the importance of civil society 
mobilisation in shaping the AIDS and international health agendas. Continued 
support for civil society organisations is necessary for continued progress on 





The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were developed as a tool for 
focussing attention on, and mobilising resources for, development. Yet there is 
some concern that they may have been used inappropriately as planning goals 
thereby distorting priorities.  Is this the case with MDG 6 ‘to combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases’?  
 
We argue that MDG 6 was unique in that it was the international AIDS response 
that wagged the MDG6 dog, not the other way around. Whether health or 
development resources were in some sense distorted in the process is moot, 
though we argue it is unhelpful to frame donor funding as a fixed pot of money 
to be allocated through rational economic planning. Rather, we show that 
normative and political concerns were crucial to understanding the 
unprecedented mobilisation around AIDS and that the moral-economy of AIDS 
 
2 
funding and the political-economy of AIDS activism hold lessons for the post-
2015 agenda.    
 
The paper begins with a discussion of the origins of MDG6- the idea of health-
as-development pioneered at the 1978 Alma-Ata conference on primary health 
care- and the subsequent international mobilisation around AIDS. This is 
followed by a discussion of AIDS in the new millennium, in particular the 
reformulation of the health-as-development agenda by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) Commission on the Macroeconomics of Health and the 
role of international organisation in support of universal access to antiretroviral 
treatment (ART). We show how the international AIDS response mobilised 
additional funding, forged innovative interventions and partnerships to reduce 
the price of ART and contributed to MDG 8 (building partnerships for 
development) and to MDGs 4 and 5 (maternal and child health) in countries 
with major HIV epidemics.  
 
We conclude with a discussion of the moral-economy and political-economy of 
AIDS funding in the current era of international economic recession. We note 
that there has been a backlash against AIDS funding, but point out that most 
evidence suggests there have been synergies between AIDS funding, health 
funding and development objectives, especially in Africa. We argue that AIDS 
funding is driven by political and normative concerns and that it makes sense to 
use this impetus to leverage additional resources for health.  
 
The international AIDS response helped translate global health goals into 
national practices in ways that the Alma-Ata resolutions did not. It thus holds 
lessons for the post-2015 agenda about the importance of including civil society 
organisations and assisting them where necessary to ensure that global goals 
become political and practical realities at national level. By way of conclusion, 
we warn that reducing all health targets to a single goal runs the danger of 
replicating the political-economic failure of Alma-Ata and reversing the gains 
made to global health policy and practice pioneered by AIDS. Maintaining 
disease-specific targets whilst building broader coalitions in support of general 
health and development offers the best opportunity to protect and promote 
global health in the post-2015 era.   
 
 
The Origins of MDG 6 
  
The MDGs first appeared in the UN’s ‘Road Map towards the implementation 
of the United Nations Millennium Declaration’ (UN, 2001). They were drafted 
by a group of experts from across the UN, including the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Their objective was to take the Millennium Declaration
1
 forward by 
extracting clear targets and associated statistical indicators linked to an inclusive 
vision of development aimed at healing divisions over the structural adjustment 
policies of the 1980s (Jolly et al, 2005; Vandemoortele, 2011: 4, 8; Fukuda-Parr 
and Hulme, 2011). In so doing, they drew on notions of sustainable development 
first articulated in the Brundtland Report (UN, 1987) and the UNDP’s first 
Human Development Report (1990), and on a series of UN conference 
resolutions from the 1990s.  
 
The UN conferences helped mobilise around the idea of development as people-
centred (pro-poor, rights-driven), entailing both economic and social 
improvement and respect for the environment. The right to health slowly 
emerged as a development issue during this process. Echoing the Rio 
Declaration of 1992,
2
 the World Social Summit in 1995 stated that ‘people are at 
the centre of our concerns for sustainable development and that they are entitled 
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with the environment’. It resolved, 
inter alia, to ‘attain universal and equitable access to education and primary 
health’ but no targets were set.
3
 The agenda of setting targets was set in motion 
by a DAC/OECD summit in 1996 which argued for the need to address 
‘problems that respect no borders – from environmental degradation and 
migration, to drugs and epidemic diseases’ (DAC 1996: 1). It developed six 
goals with clear indicators and deadlines including what were to become MDGs 
4 and 5, namely to reduce child mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality 
by three quarters. Despite mentioning epidemic diseases, no other health goals 
were set – the document merely observed that ‘child mortality, as a measure of 
the availability of health and nutrition for the most vulnerable members of 
society, is a key indicator of the overall state of health in a society’ (1996: 10).  
 
The Millennium Declaration does not mention health, but the Road Map 
document that followed it highlights health as ‘part of an essential strategy to 
achieve sustainable development’ (UN, 2001: 3). In this regard, it drew on the 
health-as-development agenda articulated initially in 1978 at Alma-Ata by the 
first international conference on primary health care. The Alma-Ata Declaration
4
 
declared health to be a ‘fundamental human right’, and stated that inequality of 
health status especially between developed and developing countries was 












‘politically, socially, and economically unacceptable’. Arguing that the 
‘promotion of the health of the people is essential to sustained economic and 
social development and contributes to a better quality of life and to world peace’ 
it called on governments, donors, international organisations and health workers 
to ‘support [the] national and international commitment to primary health care 
and to channel increased technical and financial support to it, particularly in 
developing countries’. The year 2000 was set as the target for achieving a level 
of health that allows all people to lead socially and economically productive 
lives.  
 
The Alma-Ata declaration took place within the context of growing support 
from developing countries for a ‘new international economic order’ involving 
enhanced access to developed country markets and significant redistribution of 
resources in favour of developing countries. This had been raised at the UN in 




 UN Special Assemblies) but had generated only 
heated discussion and by the end of 1970s the industrialised countries had side-
lined it (Jolly et al 2005: 11). In the 1980s, it was IMF/World Bank structural 
adjustment policies that dominated the international development agenda. But as 
it became clearer that they were failing to promote development (and indeed, 
were probably undermining it), the agenda opened up again to include 
consideration of the link between people-centred policies and development. One 
of these was health.   
 
The health-as-development agenda pioneered at Alma-Ata was re-invigorated by 
the World Bank’s 1993 World Development Report Investing in Health and the 
UNDP’s 1996 Human Development Report which argued for considerable 
investment in education health and nutrition as a prerequisite for human 
development (1996: 66). Woodling et al argue that the Word Bank sparked a 
‘game-changing rhetorical shift: a move away from viewing health as a cost 
governments face to seeing it instead as an investment opportunity’ (2012: 
s148). But while this was indeed an important idea, it was not a new one and 
there is little evidence that it was as ‘game-changing’ as these discourse analysts 
suppose. Subsequent UN conferences did not emphasise health-promotion or 
disease-eradication as a pre-requisite for development: the 1995 World 
Conference on Women (Beijing) produced a single disease-related strategic 
objective (C3: to undertake gender-sensitive initiatives that address sexually 
transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and sexual and reproductive health issues) but 
no associated targets or indicators were developed;
5
 and the 1994 Cairo 
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Conference on Population and Development
6
 mentioned AIDS in the context of 
morbidity and mortality and HIV prevention in the context of reproductive 
rights and reproductive health, but likewise came up with no associated 
indicators or targets.  
 
This tepid level of commitment reflects the absence of political will and lack of 
energy on the part of the international donors to take the disease agenda forward 
– even though it was clear by mid-1990s that HIV was undermining health and 
development, particularly in high prevalence African countries (Mann, 1992; 
Mann and Tarantola, 1996). Part of the problem was that the HIV epidemic has 
complex socio-economic causes and that the multi-sectoral response needed to 
fight it was hampered by fragmentation and lack of co-ordination between the 
various UN agencies. Equally problematic was the infighting within the WHO 
over the size and operation of its Global Program on AIDS.  
 
Jonathan Mann, the first director of the Global Program (1987-1990), was a 
successful fund-raiser but ran into bureaucratic obstacles as he bypassed WHO 
regional structures in his engagement with national HIV prevention programmes 
(Piot, 2012: 175-81). He was succeeded by Michael Merson who began a 
consultative process within the UN to create a new entity, UNAIDS, to focus 
and co-ordinate the UN’s response to AIDS. Peter Piot, a medical scientist with 
experience working on HIV in Africa, was appointed its first director in 1994 
but it took a further two years of negotiations with the ‘co-sponsoring’ UN 
agencies over structure and function before UNAIDS could begin operations in 
1996 (Piot, 2012: 227-8).   
 
UNAIDS was unique in the way that it worked across a diverse and lumbering 
UN system. When it eventually emerged it was, as Piot recalls, a ‘taut little 
mammal in a world of brontosauruses’ (2012: 232). It was also unique in that it 
had five non-governmental organisations (one each from Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, North Africa and Europe) on its board – a product of Piot’s insistence 
that being accountable to ‘the people’ meant more than being accountable to 
governments or UN agencies. Both features are crucial to understanding the 
political and institutional success of UNAIDS in shaping and driving the AIDS 
response at national and international levels.  
 
UNAIDS concentrated on working closely with national governments and on 
raising awareness of the scale and dangers posed to the world by AIDS. It 
prioritised obtaining good statistics (antenatal clinic survey data) and 
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epidemiological estimates of HIV prevalence and demographic impact. This was 
important in enabling UNAIDS to convince the other UN agencies of the threat 
posed by AIDS. For example, Piot organised a seminar at the World Bank in 
January 1998 where he presented graphs showing changes in life-expectancy 
and deaths by age. He recalls that ‘these images had a big impact on the World 
Bank, because economists could look at them and immediately understand the 
age-specific impact on productive people. We were finally speaking their 
language’ (2012: 251). The following year, the World Bank launched its Multi-
country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP), an emergency response which framed 
AIDS as a major threat to development in Africa because it ‘kills so many adults 
in the prime of their working and parenting lives… decimates the workforce, 
fractures and impoverishes families, orphans millions, and shreds the fabric of 
communities’ (World Bank, 1999: 5). 
 
UNAIDS broadened its advocacy work in the late 1990s to include the media, 
and to work with organised religion to reduce outright hostility to condoms 
(Piot, 2012: 267-70). This ground-up approach was supplemented by high level 
support from Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General from 1997-2006. In 
December 1999, Annan convened a meeting with the major aid agencies and 
African ministers, activists and business leaders which, as Piot recalls, ‘signalled 
to the donors that they needed to get their act together’ and ‘meant that Africa 
started slowly to take ownership of the AIDS issue’ (2012: 271). The following 
year, Annan told the UN Security Council that the destructive impact of AIDS in 
Africa was equal to that of a war and that the socio-economic impact of AIDS 
threatened political stability (Annan, 2000). UN Security Council Resolution 
1308 resolved that all peace-keeping operations were to have an HIV prevention 
component.
7
 The following year the UN General Assembly held a Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) where much of the debate focused on 
managing ART and HIV prevention services in Africa (Copson, 2003) and 
where it was accepted that HIV was a threat to human development and security. 
 
The road to UNGASS was neither purely serendipitous nor the product of some 
idea whose time had simply come. It reflected the efforts of people, for example 
Richard Holbrooke, the US ambassador to the UN who put AIDS on the 
Security Council agenda. But even this is not the full story because AIDS 
activism and strategic intervention by UNAIDS helped set the stage upon which 
he walked. For example, Piot recalls how he learned that Holbrooke was 
planning to visit the Africa Great Lakes region in November 1999 and so 
mobilised his international networks to make sure that local activist groups and 





people with HIV would cross his path and alert him to the severity of the 
problem – which they did, successfully (2012: 274).  
 
Piot also acted decisively to ensure that an explicit AIDS goal was included in 
the list of MDGs – by telling John Ruggie, the main drafter of the Millennium 
Declaration, that he would not leave his office until he had agreed to include 
AIDS (2012: 286). But probably more importantly, UNAIDS had already 
developed the modelling packages and the statistical indicators (HIV prevalence, 
orphans, people in need of treatment etc.) that could, and were, included by the 
drafters of the MDG targets. The formulation of MDG6 was thus trailing rather 
than distorting the AIDS response.   
 
MDG 6 broke the mould set by the UN conferences of the 1990s in that it 
highlighted the importance in eradicating disease as an essential part of a 
development agenda. It called for the halving of the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
malaria, and for a radical increase in the amount of global resources spent on 
AIDS, from the less than $1 billion then being spent on the disease to the 
UNAIDS desired target of $7 to $10 billion- Table 1 (UN, 2001). The Road Map 
touched on another goal that was also crucial to the AIDS response, namely ‘to 
encourage the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely 
available and affordable by all who need them in developing countries’ and ‘to 
develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society 
organizations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication’ (UN, 2001: 9). 
These became part of MDG 8 and it has been the AIDS response that has driven 




















Table 1: MDG6 Goals in the UN Road Map document 
 
Goals Strategies for moving forward 
To have, by 2015, 
halted and begun to 
reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, the 
scourge of malaria and 
other major diseases 
that afflict humanity 
 
 Achieving a target of $7 to $10 billion in total spending 
on HIV/AIDS from all sources, including affected 
countries; 
 Urging the international community to support the Global 
AIDS and Health Fund; 
 Strengthening health-care systems and addressing factors 
that affect the provision of HIV-related drugs, including 
antiretroviral drugs and their affordability and pricing; 
 Supporting and encouraging the involvement of local 
communities in making people aware of such diseases; 
 Urging national Governments to devote a higher 
proportion of resources to basic social services in poorer 
areas since this is crucial for preventing diseases; and  
 Supporting other initiatives based on partnerships with 
the private sector and other partners in development 
To provide special 




 Mobilizing and strengthening community and family-
based actions to support orphaned and vulnerable 
children; 
 Ensuring that Governments protect children from 
violence, abuse, exploitation and discrimination; 
 Ensuring that Governments provide essential quality 
social services for children and that orphans and children 
affected by HIV/AIDS are treated on an equal basis with 
other children; 
 Expanding the role of schools as community resource and 
care centres. 
Sources: UN, 2001. 
 
 
AIDS in the New Millennium: Antiretroviral 
Treatment and the Reshaping of MDG6  
 
From 2000/1 onwards, the political environment and funding situation turned 
sharply positive for the AIDS response. Figure 1 (Merson et al, 2008; UNAIDS, 
2012a; unpublished data from UNAIDS) highlights various milestones and 
shows that AIDS funding started trending upwards from 1999 with additional 
World Bank funding, but that the steep increases happened during the early and 
mid-2000s, especially after the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB 
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and Malaria (the Global Fund) and the US President’s Emergency Fund for 




Sources: Merson et al, 2008; UNAIDS, 2012a; and unpublished data from UNAIDS. 
 




How much of the unprecedented increase for disease-specific funding can be 
attributed to, or can be seen as a consequence of, MDG6? Such counter-factual 
questions are difficult to answer because MDG6 became swept up in, and hence 
part of, the emerging international discourse that shaped the international AIDS 
response. Our reading of the various forces that came together to generate the 
unprecedented response to AIDS highlights the role of political, normative, 
organisational, institutional and biomedical factors as being the tail that wagged 
the MDG6 dog. But it is possible that MDG6 legitimated, at least for some 
donors, the evolving international agenda with regard to AIDS. Even so, it is 
worth noting that MDG6 was never an explicit mobilising or organisational 
focus for UNAIDS because it was always seeking to push the agenda beyond 
them. For example, in its 2010 publication: MDG
6
: Six Things You Need to 
Know about the AIDS Response Today, UNAIDS lists the MDG6 AIDS targets 
but then immediately poses the bolder targets of zero new HIV infections, and 
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zero AIDS deaths (UNAIDS, 2010). Representing the 6 in MDG6 as an 
exponent is a clear representation of UNAIDS’ attitude in this regard.  
 
The impact of antiretroviral treatment is crucial to understanding the moral and 
political underpinnings of the international AIDS response. In 1996, the year 
UNAIDS started operating, ART turned HIV disease from a death sentence into 
a chronic disease. But the drugs were expensive (over $10,000 per person per 
year) and thus out of reach for people in developing countries. AIDS activism, 
which had initially framed HIV/AIDS as an ‘exceptional’ disease requiring a 
human rights approach to combat stigma, shifted its focus to the international 
stage, reframing HIV as exceptional for its impact on development (Smith and 
Siplon, 2006; Smith and Whiteside, 2010). Stephen Lewis, Kofi Annan’s 
Special Envoy on AIDS in Africa from 2001 to 2006, described HIV as ‘the 
most exceptional communicable disease assault of the twentieth century’ (2009). 
Such discourse and activism added to the growing momentum around AIDS.  
 
An ART rollout had strong moral and political appeal for donors because it 
saved lives in a very immediate sense. This helped cut through the prevailing 
attitude within the donor community that aid flows should be kept at levels 
eventually sustainable by recipient countries – and a new form of international 
solidarity around health as a human right in need of sharply increased 
international funding appeared to be on the cards (Cometto et al, 2009). But 
there was another aspect to the argument in favour of rolling out ART in 
developing countries, namely that it was an investment in the sense that it would 
spur economic growth. The key document in this regard was the WHO 
Commission on the Macroeconomics of Health (chaired by Jeffrey Sachs) which 
argued that expanding the coverage of crucial health services – including the 
provision of ART – to the world’s poor could ‘save millions of lives each year, 
reduce poverty, spur economic development and promote global security’ 
(CMH, 2001). ART thus offered hope not only to patients, but also to those 
concerned about development in Africa. Antiretrovirals not only saved the lives 
of working aged adults, but helped combat the HIV epidemic by reducing the 
infectivity of AIDS patients and assisting in the prevention of mother to child 
transmission (PMTCT).  
 
This can be illustrated by a brief examination of the impact of HIV on life-
expectancy – and of the impact of ART in reversing it. Figure 2 shows how life 
expectancy fell precipitously in the hard-hit Southern African countries of 
Namibia, South Africa and Botswana (effectively wiping out the impact of two 
decades of development on this important indicator) and then trended up again 
with the assistance of ART and PMTCP. The figure includes, for comparative 
purposes, an estimate using the ASSA2008 demographic model of what life 
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expectancy would have been in South Africa in the absence of the HIV 
epidemic. It also shows that if the government’s HIV prevention and treatment 
programs had started five years earlier, i.e. not been delayed by President 
Mbeki’s AIDS denialism, (Nattrass, 2007; Piot, 2012) life expectancy would 




Sources: http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/datatools/aidsinfo/; Life expectancy at 
birth (total) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?page=1 
 
Figure 2: HIV, ART and Life Expectancy 
 
 
The push for universal access to ART was given a major shot in the arm in 2003 
when Lee Jong-wook, Director General of the WHO joined Peter Piot and 
Richard Feachem, Executive Director of the Global Fund, to declare the lack of 
access to ART in developing countries a ‘global health emergency,’ thereby 





 also announced that it was going to be allocating significant 
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resources for HIV prevention – and even more importantly, the United States 
launched PEPFAR, a five year spending program (renewed in 2008) committing 
$15 billion ($10 billion of which was new funding) to the global fight against 
AIDS. Over half was earmarked for treatment.  
 
This injected new energy into efforts to reduce drug prices. Early efforts, 
notably by UNAIDS and the French government to facilitate lower priced ART 
for developing countries were overtaken by the Clinton Foundation’s Health 
Access Initiative to bring pharmaceutical companies, donors and developing 
countries together to bring drug prices down, create combination pills and 
expand access to ART.
10
 This, coupled with the entry of the Indian firm Cipla 
into the market for generic drugs, resulted in the cost of ART in developing 
countries plummeting to $350 per patient per year in the early 2000s and to less 
than $100 in recent years (Piot: 2012: 310-314). In this regard, the international 
AIDS response has made more progress than any other international initiative on 
MDG8.E, i.e. ‘In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries’.  
 
Falling treatment costs, together with pilot projects facilitated by UNAIDS, 
Médecins Sans Frontières and the Global Fund, show that an ART rollout was 
feasible and effective and made the goal of universal access to treatment in 
developing countries both desirable and affordable to donors. It is in this context 
that the inclusion by the 2005 World Summit of an additional MDG6 target (and 
its adoption by the UN in 2006 and implementation in 2007) i.e. MDG6.B: 
universal access to antiretroviral treatment by 2010, should be understood. As 
shown in Table 2, MDG6.B expanded the health agenda to include treatment 
targets. But this was more of a response to, than a catalyst of, the push for 
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Table 2: Changes in MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases 
 
2003 – 2007 2008 – present 
Goals Indicators Goals Indicators 
Target 7: 
Have halted 





18.HIV prevalence among 15-
24 year old pregnant women;  
19. Condom use rate of the 
contraceptive prevalence rate 
19a. Condom use at last high-
risk sex 
19b. % of population aged 15-
24 with comprehensive correct 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
19c. Contraceptive prevalence 
rate 
20. Ratio of school attendance 
of orphans to school attendance 
of non-orphans aged 10-14 
Target 6.A: 
Have halted 





6.1 HIV prevalence among 
population aged 15-24 years; 
6.2 Condom use at last high-
risk sex; 
6.3 Proportion of population 
aged 15-24 years with 
comprehensive correct 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS; 
6.4 Ratio of school attendance 
of orphans to school attendance 
of non-orphans aged 10-14 
years 







for all those 
who need it 
6.5 Proportion of population 
with advanced HIV infection 











21. prevalence and death 
associated with malaria;  
22. proportion of population in 
malaria-risk areas using 
effective malaria prevention and 
treatment measures; 
23. prevalence and death rates 
associated with tuberculosis;  
24. proportion of tuberculosis 
cases detected and cured under 











6.6 Incidence and death rates 
associated with malaria 
6.7 Proportion of children 
under 5 sleeping under 
insecticide-treated bednets 
6.8 Proportion of children 
under 5 with fever who are 
treated with appropriate anti-
malarial drugs 
6.9 Incidence, prevalence and 
death rates associated with 
tuberculosis 
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis 
cases detected and cured under 
directly observed treatment 
short course 




Vandemoortele (one of the drafters of the MDGs), argues that MDG6.B and the 
three other additional targets added in 2006/7
11
 were the product of attempts by 
‘several players’ to ‘misappropriate the MDGs in order to gain support for a 
specific strategy, agenda or point of view’ (2009: 356). According to this view, 
the MDGs were never intended to be a means of imposing specific policies – 
like treatment targets – on national governments. But in the case of AIDS, the 
reshaping of MDG6 simply reflected changing international norms about what 
national governments ought to be doing – although admittedly, MDG6.B also 
provided ammunition to AIDS activists to hold their governments to account.    
 
By 2005, when the G8 committed to doubling aid to Africa and providing 
universal access to ART in Africa, the world economy had enjoyed strong 
growth for over half a decade. Pledges to end global poverty and provide 
universal access to ART resonated as utopian, but achievable, given sufficient 
and on-going global solidarity. Unfortunately, the 2007/8 global financial crisis 
inaugurated a tougher funding environment. Even so, in 2011, the UN produced 
a further political declaration on AIDS, committing member states to scale up 
HIV prevention and treatment efforts.
12
 It continued to describe AIDS as a 
global emergency, a human catastrophe, and a development disaster requiring an 
exceptional response. And, in an indication of how the international AIDS 
response has shaped political attitudes and promoted a more inclusive human 
rights agenda, it mentioned, for the first time in any UN political declaration, 
men who have sex with men, injecting drug users and sex workers as groups 
disproportionately affected by HIV.    
 
The 2011 UN Declaration also called on donor countries to allocate at least 
0.7% of their national income to aid, and African countries to meet the Abuja 
target (set by the Organization for African Unity in 2001 at a conference in 
Abuja, Nigeria) of allocating 15% of their national budgets to health.
13
 While 
these objectives are economically achievable and some progress has been made 
towards achieving them (UNAIDS, 2012b), the international political climate 
for expanding resources for AIDS is challenging and there are clear signs of 
donor fatigue. This is impacting on the post-2015 international development 
agenda, and on AIDS funding specifically. 




 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, sixty-fifth session, agenda item 10: 65/277. 









The Moral-Economy of AIDS Funding 
 
One of the problems with the way that AIDS was framed as a general threat to 
human security and development was that the negative impact on development 
was true only for Africa, and specifically for Southern Africa, the epicentre of 
the epidemic. As shown in Figure 2, the drop in life expectancy in Botswana, 
Namibia and South Africa was not mirrored in aggregate for low- and middle-
income countries and is barely perceptible for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. 
Expanded ART access in developing countries outside the high HIV prevalence 
African countries was best articulated as a matter of human rights, but as the 
health-as-development agenda gained traction for the AIDS response, the 
distinction became blurred in the rhetoric around AIDS.  
 
An unfortunate consequence of this is that the discourse of AIDS exceptionalism 
was increasingly decried as exaggerated. According to Altman and Buse: 
 
‘The political reality is that AIDS cried wolf too often, and the more 
dire warnings have failed to materialize. In most parts of the world, 
AIDS is not a security or development crisis, and the perception that 
the response has received too much attention and funding is growing’ 
(2012: 132).  
 
This has fed into a broader backlash against funding for AIDS within 
development circles and the notion that the strong early response to AIDS came 
‘at the expense’ of other health initiatives has hardened into a stylized fact in the 
minds of many influential commentators (see for example Easterly 2006; 
England 2007a, 2007b; Garrett, 2007; Bongaarts and Over, 2010). But while 
AIDS funding certainly grew at unprecedented rates, it is worth noting that, 
from the mid-2000s, other health-related funding also rose in absolute terms. 
There are indications that AIDS may have displaced donor dollars for malaria in 
some cases (Lordan et al, 2011) and that essential health services were affected 
in countries where the density of health-care providers was low (Grepin, 2012). 
However, the rise in health spending overall appears to have more than 
mitigated such effects (Shiffman, 2008) and funding for malaria rose from less 
than US$100 million in 2000 to US$ 1.71 billion in 2010 (WHO, 2012a: 15). 
Furthermore, as the international AIDS response matured beyond its initial 
emergency phase, UNAIDS and the Global Fund deliberately sought greater 
synergies within the public health sector (such as stream-lining HIV and TB 
treatment services) which meant that the distinction between funding for AIDS 
and funding for health services became increasingly difficult to draw in any 




Precisely because the international AIDS response was multi-sectoral in nature, 
it benefitted many of the other MDGs (UNAIDS, 2011). For example, in high 
HIV prevalence countries, PMTCT and ART had a significant impact on infant 
mortality (MDG 5). Figure 3 shows that in South Africa, such interventions had 
a marked reduction in infant mortality (compared to the no-intervention 
scenario) and that if the AIDS response had been faster, so would have been the 
reduction in infant mortality. Other studies have similarly pointed to synergies 
between the AIDS response and improvements in maternal and child support 
services and general health-systems strengthening (e.g. Jerome and Ivers, 2010, 
Price et al, 2009, WHO Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 




Source: Own projections using the ASSA2008 model. Available:  
http://aids.actuarialsociety.org.za/ASSA2008-Model-3480.htm 
 




Note also that even if it would hypothetically have been better, in some sense, 
for funding to have flowed directly to other objectives, there is no guarantee that 
this would have happened and the chances are that it would have simply fallen 
in aggregate. Donor funding is not driven by neoclassical cost-benefit calculus, 
rather it is a moral economy shaped by values and politics. This is most 
obviously the case with regard to the United States which is not a typically 
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generous international donor yet provides 59% of all donor funding for AIDS to 
low- and middle-income countries, and over one and a half times as much as the 
rest of the OECD to combatting sexually transmitted diseases in Africa 
(Nattrass, 2013). US commitment to AIDS funding has remained strong even 
after the 2007/8 financial crisis when international public health funding from 
other OECD countries slackened. This is because AIDS, unlike other 
development causes, had strong bi-partisan political support of the kind unlikely 
to be replicated easily for other health or development objectives.    
 
This is an important point with implications for how we think about the 
allocation of development resources. Specifically, it makes no sense to argue 
that AIDS funding should be reallocated to other priorities when it was precisely 
because AIDS was seen as a moral and political priority that the resources were 
raised for it in the first place.  Rather, donor funding should be understood as a 
moral economy of resource allocation, and that in the case of AIDS funding, it is 
probably more strategic for the wider development community to work with the 
international AIDS response to ensure greater synergies between AIDS and 
other development objectives, and to leverage additional resources on the back 
of it.  
 
 
Lessons for the Post-2015 Agenda: Taking 
Political-economy seriously 
 
A recent WHO discussion document calls for a single health goal for the post-
2015 era: ‘universal health care’ with a single indicator: life expectancy (WHO, 
2012). The idea is that countries should design and implement interventions 
appropriate to their disease profile and level of development (WHO, 2012b). 
This has distinct echoes with the Alma-Ata declaration which left the design and 
delivery of primary health care dependent on what ‘the community and country 
can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-
reliance and self-determination’. Unfortunately, as the fate of the Alma-Ata 
primary health care agenda attests, there is no guarantee that this will be 
effective.    
 
Improving health outcomes is as much a political challenge as it is a 
technical/planning challenge (Buse et al, 2007). For example, in the absence of 
national and international mechanisms to hold national governments to account, 
funds for general budget support are all too easily misappropriated or shifted to 
other purposes (Unwin, 2004; De Renzio, 2006). As an evaluation of World 
Bank health funding concluded, ‘the most pervasive lesson from the Bank’s 
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experience with health reform is that failure to fully assess the political economy 
of reform and to prepare a proactive plan to address this issue can considerably 
diminish prospects for success’ (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 
2009). The Alma-Ata Declaration’s weak blandishments about the need for 
‘political will’ and to involve people in the planning and implementation of 
health care remained mere words on a page.  
 
The problem with using life expectancy as the single country target is that the 
relationship between government policy and the performance of the indicator is 
indirect, and subject to substantial measurement error. It is thus less useful than 
disease-specific targets for holding governments to account. Furthermore, by 
moving away from AIDS-specific targets, it threatens to undermine the role of 
the only effective citizen-driven health lobby ever to emerge in developing 
countries: AIDS activism.  
 
It would be less risky to adopt a more pragmatic approach which builds on the 
energies, organisations and institutions created by the AIDS response to expand 
health care delivery at national level. This, as UNAIDS has pointed out in its 
‘AIDS plus MDGs’ analysis, has the potential to enhance progress on the other 
MDGs precisely because combatting AIDS requires a multi-sectoral approach 
(Figure 4). And by linking the struggle for ART with demands for a better 
health-care system, new dynamism can be injected into the broader global health 
agenda by involving networks of AIDS activists to hold governments to account.  
 
It is important to remember that because HIV disease is a chronic illness, ART 
patients have an on-going incentive to fight for ART and more effective health 
systems. As Yu et al noted in an assessment of the evidence of the relationship 
between AIDS spending and health systems:  
 
‘AIDS activists increasingly advocate for the right of access to 
universal primary health care. They have also changed the dynamics 
between health care providers and clients, thus helping prepare health 
systems for the delivery of chronic care, which requires much more 
give-and-take between care providers and their clients than does the 
delivery of acute care. Indeed it is the activism for AIDS that has 
created solidarity about health as a concern for humanity, and as part 






Source: UNAIDS, 2011: 4. 
 
Figure 4: Synergies between MDG6 and the other MDGs 
 
 
More recently, Mark Dybul, Executive Director of the Global Fund, told civil 
society organisations that they were essential to the partnerships needed to 
address global diseases: ‘We need your active role in creating, building and 
sustaining the movement that we need to defeat AIDS, TB and malaria….. 
Partnerships are what make the Global Fund effective.’
14
 Indeed, as the UN 
Road Map document noted back in 2001, a key objective of the MDGs was to 
‘trigger action and promote new alliances for development’ (page 55, Annex 
paragraph 3). The Global Fund helped achieve this by requiring funding to be 
channelled through ‘country co-ordinating mechanisms’ involving government 
and civil society representatives,
15
 and UNAIDS deliberately worked with both 
national governments and domestic and international AIDS activist 
organisations.   
 
This has assisted citizens to become more effective in their engagement with the 
state. As Keck and Sikkink point out, global activist networks have helped 
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domestic actors achieve greater leverage over the national governments by 
bringing international pressure to bear (1998: 12). De Waal makes a similar 
point, noting that African governments now find themselves in ‘new webs of 
accountability’ as citizen activists diversify their channels of influence (2006: 
58-9). This was very much the case for the South African government, which 
found itself on the losing side of a political battle fought by activists linked into 
international networks and supported by institutions like UNAIDS (Grebe, 
2011). And, even in countries like Brazil and Thailand with government’s 
committed to addressing the AIDS epidemic, vigilant national and international 
activist networks helped keep political momentum going for the fight (Nattrass, 
2008; Nun et al, 2012).  
 
UNAIDS devotes substantial resources to monitoring progress towards a range 
of targets, and country reports are available on the UNAIDS website. As the 
International Development Law Organisation observes, this ‘provides the 
opportunity to track States’ compliance with international commitments on HIV, 
and identify obstacles and areas for increased support’. Additionally, the ‘post-
2015 development agenda on health should ensure that such monitoring of the 
global HIV response continues’ (IDLO, 2012: 3). 
 
Such monitoring will not be effective in the absence of clear disease-specific 
targets. Furthermore, it will make it harder for activists to advocate for improved 
service delivery without them. By framing universal access to treatment as an 
important international moral and developmental objective, international targets 
such as MDG.6B and the ‘3 by 5’ campaign provided ammunition for domestic 
political activists to hold their governments to account. For example, an editorial 
in the Lancet in May 2005 opined that ‘Without South Africa on board, with its 
837,000 people affected by HIV/AIDS and its leadership position within Africa, 
3 by 5 is but a pipe dream’. This prompted the South African health minister to 
release figures showing that the long awaited ART rollout was gaining pace. She 
said: 
 
‘I don’t want to be pushed or pressurized by a target of three million 
people on antiretrovirals by 2005… WHO set that target themselves. 
They didn’t consult us. I don’t see why South Africa today must be 




But the fact that South Africa had been singled out clearly rankled the 
government and the combination of international and domestic pressure 
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eventually resulted in the South African government changing its policy on 
AIDS (Nattrass, 2007; Grebe, 2011).   
 
A lesson for the post-2015 agenda is that global health goals should be set in 
ways that reflect and support efforts of citizens and governments to improve 
health and development outcomes. Reducing MDG6 to a single, inevitably 
nebulous, target is not as helpful as disease-specific targets where the role of 
government intervention in assisting their achievement is clearer. Furthermore, 
maintaining support for advocacy organisations and civil society groupings, and 
keeping their representatives on the boards of international organisations like the 




































Altman, D. & Buse, K. 2012. Thinking politically about HIV: political analysis 
and action in response to AIDS. Contemporary Politics, 18 (2): 127-140.  
 
Annan, K. 2000. We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21
st
 
Century. New York, United Nations.  
 
Bongaarts, J. & Over, M. 2010. Global HIV/AIDS Policy in Transition. Science, 
328: 1359-136, June 11. 
 
Buse, K., Dickenson, C. with Gilson, L. & Murray, S. 2007. How can the 
analysis of power and process in policy-making improve health outcomes? ODI 
Briefing Paper 25, October. 
 
Cometto, G., Ooms, G., Starrs, A. & Zeitz, P. 2009. A global fund for the health 
MDGs? The Lancet, 373 (9674): 1500-1502.  
 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH). 2001. Macroeconomics 
and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development. Geneva: World 
Health Organization. 
 
Copson, R. 2003. AIDS in Africa.  Issue Brief for Congress, 24 April. 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/20243.pdf   
 
De Renzio, P. 2006. Aid, Budgets and Accountability: A Survey Article. 
Development Policy Review 24(6): 627-645. 
 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 1996. Shaping the 21
st
 Century: 
The Contribution of Development Co-operation. Paris: OECD.  
 
De Waal, A. 2006. AIDS and Power: Why there is no political crisis—yet. 
London and Cape Town: Zed Books and David Philip. 
 
Easterly, W. 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the 
rest have done so much ill and so little good. New York: Penguin 
 
England, R. 2007a. Are we spending too much on HIV? British Medical 
Journal, 334(7589): 344.  
 
England, R. 2007b. The Dangers of Disease-Specific Programs for Developing 




Fukuda-Parr, S. 2012. Should global goal setting continue, and how, in the post-
2015 era?  DESA Working Paper, No. 117. New York: United Nations. 
 
Fukuda-Parr, S. & Hulme, D. 2011. International Norm Dynamics and the ‘End 
of Poverty’: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals. Global 
Governance, 17: 17-36.   
 
Garrett, L. 2007. The Challenge of Global Health. Foreign Affairs, 86(1): 14-38, 
January 1.  
 
Grebe, E. 2011. ‘The Treatment Action Campaign’s Struggle for AIDS 
Treatment in South Africa: Coalition-building Through Networks’. Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 37(4):849–868. 
 
Grepin, K. 2012. HIV Donor funding has both boosted and curbed the delivery 
of different non-HIV health services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Health Affairs, 31 
(7): 1406-1414. 
 
Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. 2005. The Power of UN Ideas. Lessons from 
the First 60 Years. New York: UN.   
 
International Development Law Organisation. 2012. Health in the Post 2015 
Development Agenda. December.   
http://www.idlo.int/Publications/121231HealthLawPost2015Agenda.pdf 
 
Jerome, J. G. & Ivers, L. C. 2010. Community health workers in health systems 
strengthening: a qualitative evaluation from rural Haiti. AIDS, 24(S1): S67-72. 
 
Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. 1998. Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks 
in international politics. New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Lewis, S. 2009. Scientists must use their talents and consciences to combine 





Lordan, G., Tang, K. & Carmignani, F. 2011. Has HIV/AIDS displaced other 
health funding priorities? Evidence from a new dataset of development aid for 




Mann, J. M. 1992. AIDS in the World. USA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Mann, J., & Tarantola, D. J. (Eds.). 1996. AIDS in the World II. USA: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Merson, M., O’Malley, J., Serwadda, D. & C. Apisuk. 2008. The History and 
Challenge of HIV Prevention. Lancet, 372: 475-488. 
 
Nattrass, N. 2008. The (Political) Economics of Antiretroviral Treatment in 
Developing Countries. Trends in Microbiology 16 (12): 574-578. 
 
Nattrass, N. & Gonsalves, G. 2010. AIDS Funds: Undervalued. Letter published 
in Science, 330: 174-5, 8 October. 
 
Nattrass, N. 2013. US Foreign Aid and the African AIDS epidemic. Yale 
Journal of International Affairs, 8 (1): 52-61. 
 
Nunn, A., Dickman, S., Nattrass, N., Cornwall, A. & Gruskin, S. 2012. The 
impacts of AIDS movements on the policy responses to HIV/AIDS in Brazil and 
South Africa: A Comparative Analysis.  Global Public Health.  7 (10): 1031-
1044.  
 
Piot, P. 2012. No Time to Lose: A Life in Pursuit of Deadly Viruses. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company.  
 
Price, J. E., Leslie, J. A., Welsh, M. & Binagwaho, A. 2009. Integrating HIV 
clinical services into primary health care in Rwanda: a measure of quantitative 
effects. AIDS Care, 21(5), 608-614. 
 
Smith, J. & Whiteside, A. (2010). The History of AIDS Exceptionalism. Journal 
of the International AIDS Society, 13:47. Available from: doi: 10.1186/1758-
2652-13-47. 
 
Shiffman, J. 2008. Has donor prioritization of HIV/AIDS displaced aid for other 
health issues?  Health Policy and Planning. 23 (2): 95-100.  
 
Smith, R. & Siplon, P. 2006. Drugs into Bodies: Global AIDS Treatment 
Activism. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
 
UN. 1987. Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on 





UN. 2001. Road Map towards the implementation of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary General. 56
th
 session, 






: Six Things You Need to Know about the AIDS Response 









UNAIDS. 2012a. Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 
2012. Geneva: UNAIDS. 
 
UNAIDS. 2012b. AIDS dependency crisis: Sourcing African Solutions.  
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/publications/2012/name,67597,en.asp 
 
UNDP. 1990. Human Development Report 1990. Oxford: UNDP and Oxford 
University Press.  
 
UNDP. 1996. Human Development Report 1996. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). 2003. Millennium Development 




UNSD. 2008. Millennium Development Goals Indicators. United Nations. 
January 2008.  
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm 
 
Unwin, T. 2004. Beyond Budgetary Support: Pro-Poor Development Agendas 




Vandemoortele, J. 2011. The MDG Story: Intention Denied. Development and 
Change, 42(1): 1-21.   
 
Woodling, M., Williams, O., & Rushton, S. 2012. New Life in Old Frames: 
HIV, Development and the ‘AIDS plus MDGs’ approach. Global Public Health, 
7 (S2): S144-158. 
 
World Bank. 1993. World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health. 
Washington D.C: World Bank.   
 
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. 2009.  Improving Effectiveness and 
Outcomes for the Poor in Health, Nutrition and Population: An Evaluation of 
World Bank Group Support Since 1997. Washington D.C: World Bank.  
 
World Health Organization. 2003. Treating 3 million by 2005: Making it 




World Health Organization Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative 
Group. 2009. An assessment of interactions between global health initiatives and 
country health systems. The Lancet.  373 (9681): 2137-2169. 
 





World Health Organisation. 2012b. Positioning Health in the Post-2015 
Development Agenda. WHO Discussion Paper, October 2012.  
 
World Bank. 1999. Intensifying Action against HIV/AIDS in Africa: Responding 
to a Development Crisis.  Washington D.C.: World Bank.  
 
Yu, D., Souteyrand, Y., Banda, M.A., Kaufman, J. & Perriëns, JH. 2008. 
Investment in HIV/AIDS programs: Does it help strengthen health systems in 
developing countries?  Globalization and Health, 4:8. Available from: doi: 
10.1186/144-8603-4-8. 
  
